Abstract
I. Introduction
There are uncountable social and economic situations in which our decision making is influenced by what others around us are doing. Think everyday life: we often decide on which restaurants, jobs, and schools (sometimes even degrees) to choose based on how popular they seem to be. Moreover one of the most striking regularities of human society is localized conformity. Japanese act Japanese, Indians act Indian and British act British.
Economists have proposed several different theories to explain the existence of social conformity. These include benefits from conformity for its own sake 2 , sanctions imposed on deviants 3 , externalities 4 , and social learning, which refers to situations in which individuals learn by way of observing the behavior of others.
Among these many theories, social learning alone explains not only why a society settles on a single pattern of behavior but also why mass behavior may be idiosyncratic, error-prone and fragile, in the sense that small shocks may cause behavior to shift suddenly and dramatically.
Additionally an important characteristic of these social learning models and of the 'real world' is an asymmetric distribution of information. It is natural to associate symmetry with the divine 5 and an almost perfect world. The economic system that we pervade makes for a compelling antithesis of that very divine. Moreover, this could not be more prevalent than in the distribution of information in the economy. With an asymmetric distribution, there is reason to be 'nosy' and infer more about the underlying state of the world from the actions of others.
Thus the social learning literature 6 analyzes an economy where a sequence of individuals is supposed to make an once-in-a-lifetime decision under incomplete and asymmetric information. The typical conclusion is that, despite the asymmetry of information, eventually every individual imitates her predecessor, even though she would have chosen a different action on the basis of her own information alone. In this sense, individuals rationally (in the Bayesian sense) 'ignore' their own information and 'follow the herd' 7 .
It is important to note that almost all learning models assume perfect information:
every agent is assumed to be informed about the entire history of actions that have already been taken. The individual is thus comparing her information with that of a large number of other individuals. This is an obvious shortcoming of these models as in reality, individuals have imperfect information. If each individual observes the actions of only a small number of other individuals, it is not clear that 'herd behavior' will arise. 8 discuss an imperfect-information model. The model provides outcomes that are quite distinct from and in some ways more extreme than the perfect-information model. They claim that such a model provides "better answers" to such questions as: Why do markets move from 'boom' to 'crash' without settling down? Why is a technology adopted by a wide range of users more rapidly than expected and then, suddenly, replaced by an alternative? What makes a restaurant fashionable overnight and equally unexpectedly unfashionable, and so on?
The most important distinction between perfect and imperfect information is that learning under perfect information has a martingale property that allows one to establish convergence of beliefs and actions. Under imperfect information, however, the learning process is not a martingale. show that this has an important implication: beliefs and actions are not convergent but cycle forever.
Despite this instability, however, over time, private information is increasingly "ignored" and decision makers become increasingly likely to imitate their predecessors. Consequently, the model predicts longer and longer periods of uniform behavior, punctuated by infrequent switches. Under perfect information, social learning eventually ceases as individual behavior becomes purely imitative and hence is uninformative. 7 The reasoning is as follows: agents observe private signals of some underlying state and make public decisions. Subsequent decision makers need to not only calibrate the implications of their private signals, but also what the decisions of there predecessors implied. They face a dilemma if their own private signal is indicative of something, which is contrary or unlikely given the previously observed decisions. Bayesian reasoning will eventually lead to ignoring your own private signals and following others. The analysis becomes trivial in the absence of conflict between private signal and previous announcements. 8 Smith and Sørensen (1996) also relax the perfect information assumption. The two papers however differ in two ways. First, show that behavior can be drastically different under perfect and imperfect information. Second, they are able to describe not only the long-run outcomes but also the medium-run properties and behavior in case of divergence.
Thus, the perfect-and imperfect-information versions of the model share the conclusion that individuals can, for a long time, make the same choice. The important difference however is that, whereas in the perfect-information model a herd is an "absorbing state", in the imperfect-information model, there are continued, occasional and quick shifts in behavior.
In spite the obvious shortcomings of the perfect information setting, this paper will restrict its attention to such a framework as the theoretical and experimental methodology of an imperfect setting are beyond its scope.
Finally, it is important to note that rational inferences and subsequent cascading need not always be a good thing from a welfare perspective. Moreover herd behaviour has been deemed pathological because erroneous outcomes may occur despite individual rationality, and they may in fact be the norm in certain circumstances. Particularly interesting in this regard is the possibility of "reverse cascades" (Anderson and Holt, 1997) or what is also referred to as "herd externalities" . A reverse cascade occurs when initial decision makers are unfortunate to observe private signals that indicate the incorrect state, and a large number of followers may join the resulting pattern of "mistakes," despite the fact that their private signals are more likely to indicate the correct state. This fact is reiterated by Choi et al (2005) : "since actions aggregate information poorly, despite the available information, herds need not obtain an optimal action".
Such behaviour might also arise in financial markets, where trading decisions comes across a ticker tape in sequence. Even if early traders have no inside information, others may incorrectly infer that the previous trades reveal private information9. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) report some trading sequences in laboratory experiments that fit this pattern. Such behaviour can easily crop up in the real world as well. The problem seems to be that when there is so little available information about a particular event, the crowd ends up focusing on the few voices who supposedly know what is going on (i.e. the experts) -the near universal belief that Judge Clement would be Bush's nomination for the Supreme Court was wrong.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses some examples from the real world as well sampling the existing literature that would fit rational herding due to social learning. Section III starts with a survey and follows up with some discussion 9 In this way, some randomness in initial trades might create a price movement that is not supported by fundamentals, as in a reverse cascade. Also see Welch (1992) .
on rationality. The theoretical model is outlined in Section IV. Section V describes the experimental setup and discusses the results from the experiment. Section VI discusses a post-experiment survey, which was conducted with the participants to better ascertain their beliefs and the general rules used for decision-making.
Additionally some econometric methodology that could have been used is also discussed. Section VII looks into further extensions for future research. Section VIII has a brief discussion on the criticisms of the methodologies used. The final section contains a conclusion.
II. Examples
Over the last ten years rational herding has become an important tool in analysing how and why economic agents learn through observation in groups. Economic agents constantly learn from others, through chat, newspapers, and typically in financial markets, also through observing price movements, or buy and sell decisions by others.
A. Financial Markets
Perhaps the most relevant examples exist in the world of finance. It was suggested by Keynes (1936) , for example, that this is how investors in asset markets often behave (the "beauty contest" example). For example, when Warren Buffett buys a stock or commodity this news affects its price.
Some investors are influenced by broker cold-calls with statements that famous investors are holding a stock [see Lohse (1998) and Davis (1991) ]. E.g.: When news came out that Warren Buffett had bought approximately 20% of the 1997 world silver output, according to The Economist (1998) silver prices were sent 'soaring'.
Moreover, when Buffett's filings reported that his shareholding in American Express and in PNC Bank have increased, these shares rose by 4.3% and 3.6% respectively [Obrien and Murray (1995) ]. According to Sandler and Raghavan (1996) , 'Whether Warren Buffett has been right or wrong about a stock, investors don't like to see him get out if they're still in. There is also a family of literature on evidence regarding herding in trades; see Lakonishok et al. (1992) , Grinblatt et al. (1995 ), Wermers (1999 . Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) Madrian and Shea (2000) .
There have also been studies analysing herding behaviour amongst analysts and forecasters [See Trueman (1994) , Ashiya and Doi (2001) , Ehrbeck and Waldmann(1996) , Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) , Brown et al. (1985) and Graham (1999) 
B. Financial Theory
There is also a vast literature on learning in prices [e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, (1976) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) , and Christie and Huang (1995)], real options [Chamley and Gale (1994) ; see also Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) , Bhattacharya et al. (1986) , Zhang (1997) and Grenadier (1999) ], retail deposits [Kahn et al. (2002) ], financial innovation [Persons and Warther (1997) ], real estate and stock markets [Zeira (1999) ], corporate conservatism [Zwiebel (1995) ], and delegated portfolio management [Maug and Naik (1995) ].
Nelson (2001) offers a model of IPOs in which the decision to go public is more likely to be associated with informational cascades than the decision to hold off. This paper is off special relevance as similar to Moscarini et al. (1998) It is important to note that some negativity in the literature [Avery and Zemsky, 10 An interesting area for further research mentioned in this paper is the impact the ordering of firms would have on the total percentage of firms that go public.
(1998)] had stalled the development of financial herding for some years. However, recent work [Chari and Kehoe (2004) and Park and Sabourian (2004) ] suggests that herding might be a prime explanation for persistent price spikes and crashes, and often cited "crazy" behaviour on the markets.
C. Financial Experiments
Cascade-like behavior is sometimes even observed in asset market experiments in which some investors are informed about a state of nature and others are not [Plott and Sunder (1982) ]. In these markets, the uninformed tend to follow the trading patterns of the insiders well enough to minimize earnings differences between the two groups. There have also been studies explaining information aggregation [Plott and Sunder (1988) ] and bubbles [Smith et al (1988) ] in asset markets. Lastly Sunder (1995) provides an exhaustive survey of experiments in asset markets.
D. Other examples
Other applications are suggested by the majority-voting treatment of Hung and Plott (2001) . Some experiments that simulate sequential jury voting have been conducted, and strong patterns of cascade-like conformity are observed in many cases. There is evidence of such behaviour even in Zoology. There is evidence of imitative behaviour transmission among animals, especially in territory choice, mating and foraging [Galef (1976) , pg. 78)].
11 Mckelvey and Ordeshook (1985) discuss a model where opinion polls convey information that causes bandwagons. 12 For an interesting counter-example see DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) . Taylor (1979) and Robin (1984) 
III. Survey
Before proceeding on to the experiment, a brief discussion on uncertainty and individual rationality is warranted. Uncertainty, it is assumed, can be described by specifying random events in a given set S of 'states of the world'. A contingent history specifies a (possibly) different history for each possible state of the world. The particular contribution of Ramsey (1926) and Savage (1954) was to show that, under certain hypotheses, an individual decision maker -would ascribe a probability distribution to the states of the world in the set S, and 'von Neumann-Morgenstern' utilities to the possible histories, so that a history would be chosen in order to maximize the mathematical expectation of the 'utility' of the contingent history in each possible state of S. This is often called subjective expected utility maximisation because the probabilities are subjective in the sense that they need not conform to any of the standard frequentist or other notions of 'objective' probability. More simply,
following Harsanyi, we may simply call it Bayesian rationality.
People can be called rational only if they have a general tendency to perform justified inferences. Are human beings primarily rational or primarily biased and irrational? People sometimes fail to live up to the highest standards laid down by the normative theories of how they ought to reason. They seem to be prone to a number of biases: they have tendencies to perform various types of unjustified inference.
More specifically, Bayesian rationality has often been criticized, but mostly on the grounds that individual's actual behaviour is not in accord with it -see, for example, Drèze (1974) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Tversky and Kahneman were responsible for introducing the idea of heuristics and biases into the explanation of ordinary non-demonstrative inference (See Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky [1982] , Camerer [1995] review this literature and provide additional references). The core of this approach is that ordinary inference is sometimes mediated by general mental strategies -the heuristics -that may provide utility is some domains, but which in others create tendencies to error -the biases.
Several well-known experiments have been reported which illustrate these effects. wrongly thought that the second (b) is more likely. These subjects committed the conjunction fallacy: a conjunction cannot be more probable than one of its conjuncts, since the conjunction logically implies its conjuncts. In this particular case, there are a lot of bank clerks, one some of whom are feminists. (The very most that is possible is that all bank clerks are feminists.)
In both the questions, researchers have found that people seem to base their judgments on how representative each case is of its category, and ignore or violate relevant statistical principles. In the first case, people ignore base-rate probability. In the second, there is a tendency to match the salient information about the person described (her radical politics) to a stereotypical category (feminists), leading to the conjunction fallacy.
Q1) Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Green and the rest are Blue. A witness claims that a taxi in an accident was blue. Under tests, the witness correctly identifies both blue and green taxis on eighty-percent of occasions. What is the probability that the taxi was, in fact, blue?
15 Please see Appendix for a list of departments contacted. 16 There might be a selection bias as not every person who may have received the email bothered answering the survey. This might bias my result, however the direction of the bias can go either way. 17 However, I did not receive a single staff response.
The correct answer in this question is about 41 percent. In other words, it is more likely (59 percent) that the witness was wrong. Assuming each kind of taxi is equally likely to be in accidents, we can say that, for every 100 crashes, 85 will tend to be of green taxis and 15 of blue ones. The witness will wrongly identify 20 percent of the former (i.e. 17) and correctly identify 80 percent of (i.e. 12) are blue. Thus, he would report blue 29 times, but only be correct on 12 of them, which is approximately 41 percent. (See Pollard and Evans [1983] for the more intuitive analysis). Hence in total 31 out of 57 respondents (54%) chose an answer along the lines of previous research (70-80%, >80%). In this regard it is important to look back at the Bayes formulae for computing the correct answer.
P(Blue/ id Blue) = P(id Blue/ Blue)P(Blue)/ P(id Blue/Blue)P(Blue) + P(id Blue/Green)P(Green) 18 One respondent inserted "Not knowable" as the response. For example, evidence. which confirms that people have, after all, some reasonable appreciation of statistical principles such as the law of large numbers comes from the work of Nisbett and his colleagues (see Fong, Krantz and Nisbett [1986] ; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson and Kunda [1983] ; and a summary of this research in Holland,
Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard [1986] ). These researchers have found that this apparently general understanding can be triggered -and, conversely, inhibited -by the way the problem is framed, and its relation to a person's existing knowledge.
Whether people can rightly be characterized as using heuristics has been questioned by several authors, e.g. Cohen (1981) and MacDonald (1986) . Put briefly, Cohen's position is that since people must be rational in order to communicate, experiments which demonstrate otherwise do so either because they require knowledge outside the subject's experience, or because they have tricked the subjects into mistakes 20 .
MacDonald (1986) is sympathetic to Cohen's point of view and tries to offer additional points in its support. One interesting argument he uses concerns the subjective weighting of the information presented in the kind of problems devised by researchers in heuristics and biases. The case of Linda (see above) will serve as an example. According to MacDonald, presenting the idea of Linda's being a bank clerk 19 Not all who may have received the email replied. 20 See the commentaries to his paper by Evans and Pollard (1981) , Griggs (1981) , and Kahneman (1981). in the conjunction question is to invite one to assume it to be true -otherwise why mention it at all?
We thus have evidence that people are neither wholly at the mercy of irrational heuristics, nor naturally gifted naïve statisticians. Nevertheless, this section was meant as a spring board to initiative a discussion on some of the problems that may crop up when individuals are making decisions involving probability calculation.
IV. The Theoretical Model
The social learning model of Every agent in this structure settles with positive probability on a single action regardless and everyone rationally "herds" on the same (either good or bad) action. In this "informational cascade", socially valuable private signals are lost. Smith and Sørensen (2000) show that this result holds iff the quality of private signals is bounded.
Making a natural extension to the existing literature, Moscarini et al. (1998) consider a modified but natural model where it is common knowledge that the state of the world changes stochastically over time. They then ask how robust are the above findings to such an evolving environment. The authors find that because of the resulting information depreciation, only temporary informational cascades can arise.
In fact BHW themselves discuss at length the fragility of cascades to the release of small amount of public information.
Here, they note that any cascade will eventually come to an end not due to informational input, but instead simply because of the fading relevance of old where the state changes with 5% chance after 100 periods; they find that cascade reversals are more likely than 5%.
It is important to note that the problem of optimal experimentation in a changing environment has been addressed by Kiefer (1991) . Keller and Rady (1995) have developed a continuous-time version of the model. In the Moscarini et al. (1998) model the optimization problem and the aggregation is simple 21 . Information depreciation increases the instant value of new information but decreases its longterm value. In a social learning context, since agents are myopic, only the former effect is present, and the depreciation unambiguously discourages the non-informative cascade stage.
A finite set of individuals take sequentially a single action from a set of binary actions, a 0 and a 1 . Payoffs to actions are contingent on an unknown state of the world, ω 0 or ω 1 . Let q 1 be the common prior belief that the state is initially ω 1 . Action a 1 is more rewarding than action a 0 in state ω 1 , while the opposite is true in state ω 0 : the payoff of action a i in state ω j is 1 if i = j and 0 if i ≠ j, with i, j ∈ {0,1}. For example, action a i may be ``buy good i,'' and the state of the world ω i : ``good i is better than the alternative good j ≠ i."
After an individual's decision, the state of the world changes with chance ε, assumed for simplicity to be Markovian and independent of the current state of the world:
21 See Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) for a long-run analysis in an individual experimentation problem.
for i, j ∈ {0,1}, i ≠ j, and any n 22 .
Before choosing an action, individual n both observes a private signal σ n ∈ {σ 0 , σ 1 } and the public history of action decisions of all preceding individuals 1,2,…,n -1. The agent cannot see predecessors' signals. Private signals are drawn from a statedependent Bernoulli distribution, and are independently conditional on the current state. The probability that the signal σ i is realized in state ω j is α > ½ if i = j and 1-α < ½ if i ≠ j, with i,j ∈ {0,1}. The quality of the private signal is assumed bounded, i.e.
α < 1.
For n ≥ 2 let H n {a 0 ,a 1 } n-1 be the space of all possible period n histories of actions chosen by the n-1 predecessors of individual n. Let h n denote an element of H n . Let q n Pr(ω 1 /h n ) be the public probability belief that the state is ω 1 in period n conditional on the publicly observed history of actions chosen by the predecessors of individual n.
Similarly let r n i
Pr(ω 1 /h n , σ i ) be the posterior belief that the state is ω 1 conditional on both the public action history h n and the realization σ i of the private signal observed by individual n. A simple application of Bayes' rule yields so that 22 These results can be extended to a general two-state Markov transition matrix.
These posterior probabilities are used to compute the expected payoffs from taking the two different actions in the two states. The decision rule of agent n is to choose the action a n which gives her the highest expected payoff. Given the simple payoffs, if individual n receives the private signal σ n = σ 1 , then it is optimal to take action a n = a 1 if and only if r 1 n ≥ ½. After substituting from (2.2), this becomes q n ≥ 1-α. The decision rule can be summarized as:
where the action when indifferent WLOG minimizes the possibility of herding.
Were ε = 0, as in the models mentioned earlier, the public prior belief of individual n+1 equals the posterior belief that leads Ms. n to act according her signal σ n = σ i , i.e.
There is an informational cascade (or cascade) on action a i at time n whenever action a i is taken by individual n regardless of the individual's private signal σ n . Thus, a cascade on a 1 (respectively a 0 ) arises as soon as q k > α (respectively q k < 1-α), for then the public belief swamps either private signal. A cascade once started would never end, because public belief would remain unchanged.
With ε > 0, the dynamics change drastically; however, the cascade region is unaffected by the state switching, since that event occurs only after the decision is made.
FIGURE 3. CASCADE AND NON-CASCADE REGION
When the possibility that the state of the world has changed in the meantime is accounted for, the public prior belief of individual n+1, coming after individual n who chose a n = a i according to her signal σ n = σ i , satisfies q n+1 = (1-ε)r n i + ε(1-r n i ), which can be rewritten by (2.1) and (2.2) as Now consider the case q k > α 23 . The action chosen will be a k = a 1 , regardless of the signal σ k . The next individual k + 1 knows that a k = a 1 is uninformative, and computes the public prior belief
In general the following individual n + 1, as long as q n > α or q n < 1-α, will update her prior belief during the cascade in the same manner, according to the uninformative cascade dynamics as shown below:
The public belief dynamics are stochastic and determined by (3.1) so long as 1-α ≤ q n ≤ α (when not in a cascade) and are deterministic and follow (3.2) when either q n > α or q n < 1-α (during the cascade). Figure 3 above depicts these very dynamics. Finally, from Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, and α > ½ it follows that if the environment is changing in an unpredictable way there will never be a cascade:
Hence the above model makes clear predictions based on the relationship between ε and α. Using results from proposition 2 and corollaries 1 and 2, three versions of the same experiment were conducted in order to empirically test the same.
V. The Experiment

A. Physical Setup
In addition to the several alternatives to the Bayesian view of conformity discussed earlier, there are some which particularly may exist in an experimental setting.
Psychologists and decision theorists have found a tendency for subjects to prefer an alternative that maintains the "status quo". Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) gave subjects hypothetical problems with several alternative decisions. When one of the alternatives was distinguished as being the status quo, it was generally chosen more often than when no alternative was distinguished. This systematic preference for the status quo is an irrational bias if the decision maker's private information is at least as good as the information available to the people who established the status quo. In answering a question about an unfamiliar decision problem, however, it can be rational for a subject to select the status-quo option if it is reasonable to believe that this status quo was initially established on the basis of good information or bad experiences with alternatives.
It is important to rule out all non-Bayesian reasons for herding -therein lies one of the strengths of a laboratory experiment involving non-hypothetical scenarios: it is possible to control information flows in the laboratory and therefore to determine whether subjects tend to follow previous decision (s) only when it is rational.
Moreover conformity due to interpersonal factors (as discussed earlier e.g. network externalities etc.) can also be minimized in a laboratory experiment with anonymity and careful isolation of subjects.
Anderson and Holt (1997) created a novel experimental set up which was based on a specific parametric model (binary-signal-binary-action) taken from 26 . This physical setup can be applied to the Moscarini et. al (1996) world by simply adding an additional layer of changing worlds. Hence it is important to note that the subsequent explanation of the physical set up is based on a simple case when the worlds are not changing. . The first decision maker in the sequence, whose only information is the private draw, will predict event A if the signal is a and will predict event B if the signal is b. Hence, the prediction made by the first person will reveal that person's private draw.
26 See Scharfstein and Stein (1990) for a similar application in an agency problem. This kind of principal agent problem (trying to con someone into believing that you know something) is common, especially in the context of asset markets. 27 The payment method used in the experiments by me was slightly different. This is discussed in the next section. . In general, this rule is assumed to be the tiebreaker convention throughout this paper for all subjects.
Suppose that each subsequent individual assumes that others use Bayes' rule to make predictions 29 . For example, if the first two decisions are A and the third person observes a b signal, then this person is responding to an inferred sample of a on the first two draws, and b on the third draw. Since the events are equally likely a priori, and since the sample favours event A, the posterior probability of A is greater than ½.
In this case, the third person should predict event A in spite of the private b signal
30
.
Hence in such a set up, just the first two decisions can start a cascade in which the third and subsequent decision-makers ignore their own private information. Whenever the first and the second individuals make the same prediction, all subsequent decisionmakers should follow, regardless of their own private information. In all cases, it takes an imbalance of two decisions in one direction to overpower the informational content of subsequent individual signals.
If individuals recognize that decisions made after the beginning of a cascade are not informative, they will ignore these "irrelevant" decisions in their probability assessments. But if someone breaks out of a cascade pattern and predicts the other event, then it is reasonable to assume that this deviant decision reveals a private signal that is contrary to the cascade, because the expected cost of deviating would be higher if the signal matched those inferred from previous decisions. Therefore, relevant signals are those inferred from decisions made before a cascade starts, from the two decisions that start a cascade, and from non-Bayesian deviations from a cascade. 28 We could make an alternative assumption that decision is random, i.e., that it matches the label of the private signal with probability ½. This would not alter the analysis of cascade formation that follows, but it would alter some of the numerical probability calculations. 29 This assumption is further discussed n Section VI. 30 Here I have interpreted the two initial A decisions as indicating two a draws, i.e., that the second person would have announced B with a private b signal.
Specifically, if n is the number of relevant a signals and m is the number of relevant b
signals. Then Bayes' rule can be used to calculate the posterior probability of event A,
given any sequence of sample drawsFinally it is important to draw parallels between this physical set up and Moscarini et.
al (1996) . The binary actions a 0 and a 1 can be compared to deciding whether the true state is Urn A or Urn B respectively. The unknown state of the world, ω 0 or ω 1 can be compared to event (urn) A or B respectively. q 1 is 50% in this set up due to the initial roll of the die. ε is the chance that the true state switches between A and B after an individual's decision and is assumed for simplicity to be Markovian and independent of the current state of the world. The value's of ε are allowed to vary across treatments and is discussed in part C of this section.
Individuals also observe private signals 'a' or 'b' (σ n ∈ {σ 0 , σ 1 }) and the public history of action decisions (A or B) of all preceding individuals. α is interpreted as the probability that signal 'a' comes from Urn A or symmetrically the probability that signal 'b' comes from Urn B. The quality of the private signal is assumed bounded and is 2/3. When ε = 0 the Bayes' rule mentioned in Moscarini et. al (1996) would coincide with the Bayes' rule derived using n and m relevant signals. For non-zero values of ε = 0 Bayes' rule mentioned in section IV. should be used.
B. Procedures
A total of 23 subjects were recruited from the University of Cambridge and at least to my knowledge had no previous experience with this experiment. There was no restriction on participants and recruitment emails were sent out across the student and staff community. Each subject was paid out a John Lewis voucher worth £20 and each session lasted about 90 minutes. A total of 5 sessions were conducted with 5 subjects for each of the first three sessions and 4 subjects in each of the last two sessions. In each of the 5 sessions, subjects were asked to participate in all the three treatments.
After the experiment subjects were also asked to fill out an online 31 post-experiment questionnaire. It is important to note that a compensation scheme based on the actual performance in the experiments (similar to Anderson and Holt [1997] ) would have been a better incentive mechanism and might have made the subjects work harder.
Unfortunately such a scheme was not possible due to logistical reasons beyond my
control. However it is important that the compensation amount in this experiment (£20) exceeded the average earnings (including participation fee) in Anderson and
Holt (1997) ($25) and in ($27). In fact this was one of the reasons for choosing $20 as the amount and therefore I have assumed this to be a "reasonable compensation" to ensure subject participation and attention. Additionally it is important to point out that I had initially secured funding for a total of 50 subjects, but due to constraints of time and logistics, only 23 participants could be recruited.
The experiment was set up online using an interactive PHP based programme designed by Nishanth Sastry and Eiko Yoneki based out of the Computer Laboratory at the University of Cambridge. Within any one session, all subjects participated in the first treatment and moved on to subsequent treatments only after finishing the first treatment. Written instructions were distributed for each treatment and each subject needed to answer some basic questions to ensure that they have clearly understood the instructions. To ensure complete clarity a visual demonstration was followed after every subject had finished reading the instructions and questions were taken subsequently. To ensure anonymity, only a single participant was in the computer 31 The purpose of this questionnaire was to ensure (for post analysis) that the subjects clearly understood the aims and objectives of the experiment. Certain questions were also designed to suss out what mechanisms (if any) subjects relied on to answer the questions and how they perceived others rationality. Results to be discussed in subsequent sections.
laboratory at any one point in time. Every other participant was seated in an adjoining waiting room.
Each session consisted of 10 independent rounds per treatment. At the start of each round, the web-based program used an 'electronic' throw of the dice to determine which of the two urns would be used. Urn A was used if the throw of the die was one, two, or three; urn B was used otherwise. Subsequently a Markov Process decided the likelihood of the Urn being switched between subjects within any one round. This likelihood of state switching (which was Markovian and independent of the current state of the world) varied across the three treatments. The instructions (which were specific to each treatment) included and explained the entire structure and working of the treatment in question.
Within any one treatment the order of the subjects were chosen at random and remain fixed for all of the 10 rounds of that particular treatment. For e.g. -if subject S4 was the first decision maker in treatment 1, she would be the first decision maker in all the 10 rounds of treatment 1. Hence the first decision maker took all her 10 decisions (one per round) at the same time. Subsequently the second decision maker (second in all the 10 rounds) would take all her 10 decisions at the same time after having observed her own private signal and the first person's decision in each of the 10 independent rounds. This process continued for all the 5 subjects in the session in any one treatment. Hence after the first treatment was completed (all 10 rounds for all 5 subjects) we moved on to the second treatment wherein a new order for the subjects was decided at random. The session would be complete after the third treatment.
It is important to reemphasise that the ordering however was changed at random across treatments (while remaining fixed within any one treatment). Within in any one treatment, in each round, subject's private signals were drawn (again 'electronically') with replacement. After seeing a private draw for each of the 10 rounds, the subject would record his/her urn decision, A or B, and the decision would appear on the monitor on the subsequent subjects turn. In this way, each subject knew his or her own private draw and the prior decisions of others, if any, before making a prediction.
This process continued until all subjects had made decisions. At the end of each subjects turn, the correct Urn being used was displayed on the screen.
It is important to note that in order to strictly follow the norm in Anderson and Holt (1997) and other similar studies, one should have also randomly changed the order of decision making between rounds within each treatment. However, the software designed for this study precluded doing the same. However, it is safe to assume that this particular caveat is not central to the analysis. Nonetheless the order for each treatment was decided at random and was also changed at random between treatments.
C. Results
An information cascade is possible if an imbalance of previous inferred signal causes a person's optimal decision to be inconsistent with his or her private signal. Moreover in the words of Moscarini et. al (1996) -"there is an informational cascade (or cascade) on action a i at time n whenever a i is taken by individual n regardless of the individual's private signal σ n ".
C.a Treatment 1 (ε = 0)
In treatment 1 the state of the world does not change between subjects within any one Similarly Table 2 above shows selected cascade data from sessions 4 and 5. It is important to note that this treatment (ε = 0) is exactly the same experiment that Anderson and Holt (1997) conducted. Although that experiment was conducted with a much larger data set, the results are qualitatively the same. Similar to treatment 1, they found a high rate of conversion to cascade outcomes (cascade behaviour was observed in 41 of the 56 rounds when such behaviour was possible), a relatively small frequency of individuals only following their private information (26 per cent).
Lastly consistent with this paper they too found a very few cases where the decisions were inconsistent with both Bayes' and private information (4 per cent).
Lastly, it is encouraging to see that the outcomes in treatment 1 are not clashing with what theory would predict. Occurrence of rational cascades and the limited occurrence of inconsistent observations are not in contradiction with Proposition 2 in section IV (which predicted the occurrence of cascades in finite periods).
C.b Treatment 2 (ε = 0.5)
In treatment 2 the state of the world changes with 50 per cent chance between subjects within any one round. With α = 2/3 this treatment corresponds to Corollary 2 in section IV. Hence the theory would predict that no cascade should ever arise. With 5 sessions and 10 per rounds per session, we had a total of 50 rounds to analyse.
Moreover, with 23 subjects there were a total of 230 observations to study.
In general the broad results from treatment 2 are not in contradiction with Corollary 2. In majority of the cases, subjects ignore outcomes from their predecessors and simply follow their private information. However, there are a few cases that appear to be inconsistent. In a total of 10 observations (4 per cent of all observations) subjects have taken decisions, which would be inconsistent with their private information. Table 3 shows selected data from sessions 2 and 3 where individuals have taken decisions that are inconsistent with Bayes' Law (and private information). Consider the fourth row from above where subject S12 ignores the private signal 'b' and predicts (incorrectly) event A. It is interesting to note that this subject appears to have fallen into a trap where she/he believes that the sequence of A decisions before her/him are part of a cascade pattern. However the theory would tell us that any such thinking would be deemed incorrect as with (ε = 0.5) one should simply follow ones private signal and not follow any "herd". The other rounds in this table also appear to depict a similar pattern. Table 5 shows the longest sequence of cascade behaviour selected from sessions 1, 2 and 3. Looking at the second row (round 4) from above we can see alternating reverse cascade for subjects S8, S7 and S9 and alternating reverse cascades between S6 and S10. Similarly looking at round 9, we see S8, S7 and S9 cascading together -S7 has a reverse cascade whilst S9 has a normal cascade. Similarly Table 6 shows some selected from round 4. In this treatment it is important to note that sessions with only 4 participants (sessions 4 and 5) are not ideal for analysis as alternating cascades can only happen in pairs and hence it is not possible to analyse longer sequences of potential cascade behaviour.
Comparing the results with the theory, Corollary 1 in section IV predicted alternating cascades in finite time. Treatment 3 witnessed 15 such instances out of a total potential of 18. Hence the "conversion rate" seems to fit the theory and is similar to what was observed in treatment 1. However there does seem to be a higher frequency of behaviour that is inconsistent with both private information and Bayes'. In Treatment 3 this stood at 12 percent (compared with only 3 percent in treatment 1). It is important to note that this implies that 12 percent of the times the theory's prediction was violated (assuming common knowledge of rationality). Instances where the outcome was inconsistent with only Bayes' (the * outcome) would also be technically counted within cases where the theory is violated. Counting the same this number jumps to about 13 percent in treatment 3 (compared with 4 percent in treatment 1).
Since treatment 3 is computationally more challenging than treatment 1, it is not entirely surprising to see a higher frequency of inconsistent outcomes. However we can still find refuge in the fact that the broad prediction of Corollary 1 was not violated; alternating cascades were observed almost always when they were supposed to.
VI. Further Post Experiment Analysis
A. Survey
In experimental economics, it is of paramount importance to insure that subjects have a full and correct understanding of the mechanisms involved in the experiment.
Moreover there is an unwritten protocol that prohibits researchers from lying to subjects. Lastly, Bayesian outcomes are analysed assuming common knowledge of rationality, which, may not always be the case. After the three treatments were completed in any one session the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire with the following -
Q5 ) Were the instructions clear? Q6) What do you think was the purpose of this experiment? Q7) How did you make your decisions? Q8) What rule, if any did you use to make your decision? Q9) How do you reckon the other participants in this room made their decision?
It is important to note that Q7), Q8) and Q9) were asked specific to each treatment. In addition certain demographic questions were also asked (Gender, Nationality, Subject of study and degree level). These have not been included in this analysis, as they are not considered central to the analysis. Q5) and Q6) were incorporated to ascertain whether there was full understanding of the experiment. Q7) and Q8) were used to analyse what criteria subject's use to make decisions. Q9) was asked to better understanding the belief structure that was prevalent in the study. Questions 7,8 and 9 are important to get a deeper understanding behind the outcomes, which prima facie are considered inconsistent.
Lastly, it is important to mention that there are drawbacks in this questionnaire.
Subjects have answered questions qualitatively (apart from Q5) which were then interpreted by me. In hindsight a more rigorous approach could have included similar questions with multiple-choice answers. Survey response from Question 5 reveals that 87% of the participants understood the instructions and were not confused by it. This fact is corroborated by the responses from Q6) where all subjects correctly described the purpose of the experiment. For question 7, 87 percent and 91 percent of the respondents correctly described the decision-making criteria for treatment 1 and 2 respectively. Question 8 reveals the exact same numbers (87 and 91%) for the two treatments. This is not surprising given the low incidents of irrational or inconsistent outcomes in both the treatments.
Moreover answers from Q9) reveal that in treatment 1 96 percent of all respondents expect others to use the same logic as theirs. This number shoots up to 100 percent for treatment 2.
In treatment 3 however these numbers appear to be less healthy -in Q7) 78 percent of the respondents correctly describe the decision-making criteria. The corresponding number for Q8) in treatment 3 is 74 percent. Hence about over 20 percent of the subject population (5-6 respondents) wrongly decided on how to tackle treatment 3.
Furthermore subjects expect less rationality of others as well in treatment 3 -In question 9 13 percent of all respondents do not expect others to behave in a logical manner. These findings again seem to only reemphasize the data from treatment 3.
Treatment 3 requires a more "involved" calibration and therefore participants struggled more in assessing the correcting criteria.
In conclusion the major findings from treatment 1 and 2 are more in accord with the theory in Moscarini et. al (1996) -the outcome from the survey also showed that the participants were broadly aware of the correct decision making criteria and expected others to do the same. Finally, most subjects were not confounded by the instructions.
B. An Econometric Methodology
Given the limited amount of data (23 subjects) it would not be feasible to conduct a meaningful econometric study. A larger data set (which was originally planned) would be needed. However, the methodology deserves a brief mention [See Choi et. al (2009 ), Weizsäcker (2008 , and Anderson and Holt (1997) ].
A dynamic model (similar to a random utility model) in which people calculate posteriors allowing for the possibility of errors in earlier decisions would allow for a more rigorous analysis of question 9 from the survey in the previous subsection. Error rates are econometrically estimated assuming a logistic distribution of independent shocks to expected payoffs. The equilibrium can be summarized by a choice probability function following a binomial logit distribution:
where a it is the action of agent i at time t (Urn A or B), I it is agent i's information set at t (history of observed decisions from her predecessors), β it is a coefficient, and x it is the difference between the expected payoffs from actions a = 1 and a = 0, respectively (Urn A or B). Note that β captures the sensitivity to payoff differences. The tendency to make errors diminishes as β  ∞, while behavior becomes random as β  0. For positive values of β the choice probability is an increasing function of the payoff difference.
This model does assume that subject's should rationally take into account the mistakes of others when drawing inferences from their behavior. Hence the error structure in this model is recursive: the β parameter for the first person in the sequence affects the second person's expected payoffs, which are used in turn to estimate a β parameter for the second-stage decision. At each stage, the β estimates for previous nodes are used to calculate the expected payoffs for each decision, conditional on the private signal and the decisions observed in the previous nodes.
Then the difference in expected payoffs for a period (node) constitutes the independent variable in the estimation for that particular period (node).
Finally the maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the parameter β. Anderson and Holt (1997) recommend the Newton-Raphson algorithm to minimize the negative of the log-likelihood function (as an alternative to the recursion they also mention that the β can be restricted to be the same for all periods. However the recursive method would provide a better fit as suggested by the likelihood ratio test).
Lastly, Choi et. al (2009) also recommend some specification tests to check the restrictions that can be imposed on such a model.
It is important to note that this methodology is an adoption of the Quantal Response
Equilibrium (QRE) model of Palfrey (1995, 1998) which allows for agents to make mistakes (occasional) and can be interpreted following Harsanyi and Seltens's "trembling hand".
VII. Further Extensions
The model presented by Moscarini et. al (1996) presents a stylized reference point which has several real world applications (in finance and otherwise). Real world data in finance is "noisy" and therefore it is difficult to test for very specific questions.
Using simple experimental methodologies it is possible to test for a model (such as the changing world one), which can be broadly representative of the actual mechanisms at work in the market place. However this paper is only an initial attempt to test for herding in an uncertain world -several extensions and improvements are in order.
A. Heuristics
The physical set up of this experiment was symmetric (2 'a' balls and 1 'b' ball in Urn A and vice versa in Urn B). One implication is that subjects may suffer from a counting heuristic -it is possible to simply count the inferred signals to get accurate results. Hence observing consistent behaviour does not necessarily imply Bayesian updating on behalf of the participants. In essence the set up allows for a simple rule of thumb using which you are highly likely to get the right answer (more so in treatment 1 and 2). Anderson and Holt (1997) recommend an asymmetric setup to distinguish counting from Bayesian behaviour. Using an asymmetric set up one could test the model of changing worlds. It is important to note that with such a structure Bayes' law becomes more complicated and one could expect a greater deviation in behaviour from theory.
However, the presence of a counting heuristic does not necessarily reduce the credibility of the symmetric design. Anderson and Holt (1997) did conduct a series of experiments using an asymmetric distribution. Although they found a lower incident of rational cascades (normal) (70 percent vs. 73 percent), the overall conclusions do not change -a reasonably high occurrence of rational cascades was still observed.
Moreover only a third of the deviations from Bayes' rule in the asymmetric design could be explained by counting.
Moreover the presence of certain heuristics need not be such a bad thing. Certain simple rules of thumb can provide a "sufficient statistic" for more complicated calculations. Off particular relevance in this area is the work of the German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer. A critic of the work of Kahneman and Tversky, he focuses on how heuristics can be used to make optimal decisions rather than produce cognitive biases. Gigerenzer et. al (1999) point out that "Fast and frugal heuristics that embody simple psychological mechanisms can yield inferences about a realworld environment that are at least as accurate as standard linear statistical strategies embodying classical properties of rational judgment".
B. Herding vs. Cascades
It is important to point out that although the terms informational cascade and herd behaviour are used interchangeably in this paper, Smith and Sørensen (2000) emphasize that there is a significant difference between them. An informational cascade is said to occur when an infinite sequence of individuals ignore their private information when making a decision, whereas herd behavior occurs when an infinite sequence of individuals make an identical decision, not necessarily ignoring their private information. Thus, an informational cascade implies a herd but a herd is not necessarily the result of an informational cascade.
The practical importance of the distinction between the two is that in a cascade learning ceases, while in a herd the individuals become more and more likely to imitate but their actions may still provide some information. Hence in a herd the behavior can change suddenly and dramatically and may better explain why mass behavior is so fragile and prone to fads. Understanding such a distinction may be of importance to better streamline real world data (especially from asset prices).
In the Anderson and Holt (1997) discrete-signal-discrete-action setup all herds are cascades since once two consecutive decisions coincide no signal can lead to a deviation. In contrast, propose a continuous-signal-discrete action setup to distinguish between cascades and herds completely. Using this setup on the changing world model would enrich the literature and enable a deeper study of social learning in an uncertain world.
C. General Extensions
In addition to the above there are a host of other extensions that could provide interesting and important answers towards the study of learning in the financial world.
Within any one treatment, if subjects were made to play one round at a time and the ordering was changed between rounds, there could be a strong learning component that could be analysed. It is not unreasonable to expect questions of individual and group learning over time to have important theoretical and practical implications.
It may also be off interest and relevance to further analyse the data with respect to certain demographic fixed effects such as gender, nationality or degree of study. In In another paper Kariv (2005) studies the impact of social learning in the presence of "overconfident agents". He describes them as those who "overweigh their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others."
Therefore, when following a herd, they "broadcast" more of the information available to them. The paper goes on to show that such a situation increases the free-rider problem of rational agents. Extending this to the uncertain world in this paper would have obvious applications for trading in financial markets.
The functioning of financial markets have often been viewed as networks [See Allen and Babus (2008) , Babus (2008) , and Gale and Kariv (2007) 
VIII. Criticisms
Experiments in general have several things in their favour. Amongst other things they "weed out" bad theories, predict behaviour in the field, establish limits to the models ("stress tests"), and discover new empirical regularities.
However, the methodologies involved in experimental economics are far from perfect. There tends to be a bias in the subject pool as most participants are from a University community and hence may not have any experience with the problem at hand. In general the stakes are also not high enough to draw parallels with the real world. Additionally there tend to be a limited number of participants in any experiment and hence statistical analysis is imperfect. Finally, there are also concerns of validity (internal and external) and psychology of subjects.
Moreover, specific to this paper there are some techniques used which could have been improved upon. A better payment mechanism should have involved paying participants for every correct decision. Additionally, randomising the ordering across rounds in any session would have also been a more rigorous approach. In general increasing the subject pool from 23 to 50 (as was originally planned) would have provided more data and an opportunity to conduct an econometric analysis of the observations. There is also room for some sensitivity analysis -the results may be very sensitive on values of ε (E.g. -ε = 0.9 vs. ε = 0.8). Finally, the post experiment survey should have been conducted with multiple-choice answers.
Hence although the results from this paper provide conclusions in a certain direction, they should be interpreted with a pinch of salt due to the imperfections embodied in the experimental methodologies used.
IX. Conclusion
In any market place there would exist innumerable utility maximizing agents with incomplete information. Moreover these agents are connected and transmit signals to each other via the their respective actions. Additionally there is always an inherent uncertainty in the system as the underlying state may change from one time period to another. Understanding the informational and welfare properties of such a system would provide powerful tools for prediction and policy formation. Moscarini et. al (1996) discuss one such model where agents receive discrete signals and take once in a lifetime discrete action. The agents also receive a complete history of decisions of their predecessors but do not receive their signals. Moreover the underlying state of the world can change between agents and this process is assumed to be Markovian and independent of the current state of the world.
Relying on the experimental techniques in Anderson and Holt (1997) , this paper empirically tests the main propositions of the changing world model. When the state of the world does not change, the results are in accord with theory -the group converges to rational cascades almost always when they have such an opportunity.
Moreover, not more than 4 percent of all observations would be deemed inconsistent with the theory. When the state of the world always changes with ½ chance then also the results closely follow the theory -only 4 percent of all observations could be labelled as inconsistent with the model. Finally, when the state of the world changes almost always (90 percent chance) then also rational alternating cascade behaviour is observed almost always when it should. However, in this version of the experiment there is a higher propensity for subjects to make mistakes -almost 13 percent of all observations were inconsistent with the model. The higher frequency in this setup could be attributed to the more demanding calibration that would be required. The broad results from the post experiment questionnaire were in sync with the data from the experiment themselves. It is important to note that the general methodologies used in this paper are not without fault and hence the results must be read with caution.
Finally, the extensions mentioned in this paper deserve due attention for further research.
